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Abstract. We describe adding support for dynamic delegation of authority between 
users in multiple administrative domains, to the XACML model for authorisation 
decision making. Delegation of authority is enacted via the issuing of credentials from 
one user to another, and follows the role based access control model. We present the 
problems and requirements that such a delegation model demands, the policy 
elements that are necessary to control the delegation chains and a description of the 
architected solution. We propose a new conceptual entity called the Credential 
Validation Service (CVS) to work alongside the XACML PDP. We describe our 
implementation of the CVS and present performance measurements for validating 
delegated chains of credentials. 
Keywords. XACML, RBAC, Delegation of Authority, Credential 
Validation Service. 
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1 Introduction 
XACML [8] is an OASIS standard for writing access control policy 
languages in XML. Many people are starting to experiment with it in 
their applications e.g. [11, 12, 25]. XACML was designed as a general 
purpose access control policy language for protecting resources from 
being accessed by subjects who are identified by their attributes. Some 
of XACML’s benefits include: a flexible attribute based authorisation 
model, where access control decisions can be made based on the 
attributes of the subject, the action, the target and the environment; a 
comprehensive way of specifying conditions, so that arbitrarily 
complex conditions can be specified; and the support for obligations. 
An obligation is an action that should be performed by the application’s 
policy enforcement point (PEP) when enforcing the access control 
decision made by the policy decision point (PDP).  XACML policies 
can be built that support role based access controls (RBAC) [5], in 
which users are assigned to roles, and roles are given permissions to 
access resources. An RBAC profile for XACML has been published 
[21]. This requires two XACML PDPs to be constructed. One, the 
access control PDP, determines if the holder of a set of roles can be 
granted access to a resource. The other, the role assignment PDP, can 
only be called by the Role Authority to determine if a particular user is 
allowed to hold a particular role. There are a number of deficiencies in 
this profile. Firstly the role assignment PDP has no knowledge about 
who is a Role Authority and who is not, and therefore it cannot make 
decisions about who can assign roles.  Similarly it cannot support static 
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or dynamic delegation of authority because in these cases the Role 
Authority can change. Consequently this function has to be performed 
by the application dependent PEP. We would like it to be application 
independent. The XACMLv3 working draft [18] which has been 
undergoing development for several years, is concerned with the 
administration and delegation of policies, rather than the delegation of 
attributes from one user to another. Therefore it is complementary to 
the work described here. 
 
A delegate is defined as “A person authorized to act as representative 
for another; a deputy or an agent” [1]. Without delegation of authority 
(DOA), managers would soon become overloaded. DOA allows tasks 
to be disseminated between employees in a controlled manner. A 
delegate may be appointed for months, day or minutes, for one task, a 
series of tasks, or all tasks associated with a role. DOA needs to be fast 
and efficient with a minimum of disruption to others. Delegators should 
not need permission from their superiors for each act of delegation they 
undertake, otherwise their superiors would soon become overburdened 
with delegation requests from subordinates. Instead, a delegation policy 
should be in place so that delegators know when they are empowered to 
delegate (i.e. what and to whom) and when they are not. Delegation of 
authority is thus the act of one user with a privilege, the delegator, 
giving it to another user (the delegate), in accordance with some 
delegation policy. Static delegation of authority is when the delegation 
policy contains the complete list of delegators. No new delegators may 
be created without updating the delegation policy. Dynamic delegation 
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of authority is when the delegation policy only contains the initial set of 
delegators (the trusted root delegators) and further delegators can be 
created dynamically through the act of delegation. 
 
In the context of role based access controls there are two aspects to 
delegation of authority. One is the delegation of a role from one user to 
another. This is delegation of the user-role assignments. The other is 
the delegation to assign permissions to roles from one user to another. 
This is delegation of the role-permission assignments. The later is 
sometimes referred to as delegation of policy administration. In this 
paper we are only concerned with the former acts of delegation, where 
one user delegates his role to another user, so that the latter can carry 
out the functions of the former. This is the usual form of delegation in 
organisations. Delegation of policy administration on the other hand is 
a specialised function usually only carried out by security 
administrators, and we will not cover that in this paper. 
 
When one user delegates a role to another user, who then delegates to 
another user, recursively, a directed acyclic graph (DAG) is created, 
starting from the root user who has the role initially and is the source of 
the DAG, to the users at the sink nodes of the DAG who end up with 
the authority to assert the delegated role, but cannot delegate it further 
themselves. Intermediate nodes are users with permission to delegate, 
but may or may not be able to assert the role themselves (according to 
the delegation policy). We differentiate between static and dynamic 
delegation of authority as follows. Static delegation of authority is 
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when intermediate nodes are not allowed in the DAG and all the 
delegators are configured as root nodes in the software (or policy) prior 
to users accessing resources i.e. the depth of the delegation DAG is 
known from the start to be one, and no intermediate nodes can be 
created. Dynamic delegation of authority is when only the root user 
nodes and delegation policy are configured into the software prior to 
user access, and users may dynamically delegate authority to other 
users as and when they wish. In this case the delegation DAG is created 
dynamically as one user delegates to another, and new leaf and 
intermediate nodes are created spontaneously. 
 
A responsive authorisation infrastructure that can cater for rapidly 
changing dynamic environments should be able to validate the roles 
given to any of the users in a dynamically created delegation DAG, 
even though the actual DAG is not known when the authorisation 
policy is written and fed into the PDP. This requires the authorisation 
policy to be supplemented with a delegation policy that will state how 
the delegation DAG is to be constrained. As long as a user’s role falls 
within the scope of the delegation DAG then it is considered valid, if it 
falls outside the DAG, and thus outside the delegation policy, it is not. 
The purpose of the current research was to add dynamic delegation of 
authority to an authorisation infrastructure that contains an XACMLv2 
access control PDP (or in fact any PDP that bases its access control 
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decisions on the attributes of subjects), without changing the 
XACMLv2 PDP or its policy1. 
 
We assume that permissions are assigned to roles, or attributes in the 
more general case, and that the attributes are assigned to the users. An 
important point to clarify at the outset is the difference between an 
attribute and a credential (i.e. authorisation credential). An attribute is a 
property of an object2; a credential is a statement or assertion about an 
attribute. In particular, a credential must state: what the attribute is, 
who the attribute belongs to, who says so (i.e. who is the credential 
issuer), and if there are any policy constraints on its validity. When 
attributes of an entity do not exist as part of the entity, they are often 
stored or transferred as separate stand alone credentials. In this paper 
we are concerned with dynamic delegation of authority from one user 
to another by the use of credentials. One important feature of a 
credential is that it requires validation before the user can be attributed 
with the asserted property. 
 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the 
problems that need to be addressed when creating an infrastructure to 
                                                 
1 Note that this research originally started whilst XACMLv2 was still under construction, when 
it was known that XACMLv2 would not support dynamic delegation of authority. This was 
one of the reasons for not proposing changes to XACMLv2. Work is currently underway to 
add administrative policy delegation to XACML v3 [18], but this is complementary to the 
work described here. 
2 Dictionary.com defines an attribute as “A quality or characteristic inherent in or ascribed to 
someone or something” 
8       David W Chadwick, Sassa Otenko and Tuan Anh Nguyen 
support dynamic delegation of authority between multiple domains, and 
this leads to various requirements being placed on any proposed 
solution. Section 3 describes the new conceptual credential validation 
service (CVS) that is proposed to resolve the problems and 
requirements described in Section 2. Section 4 briefly describes the 
XACMLv2 infrastructure. Section 5 discusses how the CVS could 
conceptually be incorporated into the XACML infrastructure. Section 6 
describes our implementation of a CVS, and provides some 
performance measurements of its operation. Section 7 concludes, and 
looks at possible future work in this area. 
2 Problem and Requirement Statements 
The underlying model used for dynamic delegation of authority in 
multiple domains is an enhancement of the basic XACMLv2 model 
(see section 5). In this enhanced model a user (subject) is dynamically 
given a set of attributes by one or more dynamically created attribute 
authorities (AAs) in one or more domains, and these attributes, in the 
form of credentials, are presented (pushed) to or obtained (pulled) by a 
new functional component of the authorisation infrastructure which we 
call the Credential Validation Service (CVS). The CVS validates the 
user’s credentials and returns the valid attributes directly or indirectly 
to the PDP. The PDP then makes its access control decisions based on 
its policy, the validated set of subject attributes, the target and 
environmental attributes and the parameters of the user’s request. 
Below are a set of issues and requirements that need to be addressed by 
the new functional component in such a model. 
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1. Valid vs. Authentic Credentials. The first thing to recognise is the 
difference between an authentic credential and a valid credential. 
An authentic credential, from the perspective of authorisation 
decision making, is one that has been received exactly as it was 
originally issued by the AA. It has not been tampered with or 
modified. Its digital signature, if present, is intact and validates as 
trustworthy meaning that the AA’s signing key has not been 
compromised, i.e. his public key (certificate) is still valid. This 
means that the public key certificate has been issued by a known 
trusted root CA or one of its subordinates, and has not been revoked 
since then. A valid credential on the other hand is one that is trusted 
by the CVS’s policy for authorisation decision making. In order to 
clarify the difference, an example might be an employee certificate 
issued by the University of Kent. This credential is authentic, since 
it has been issued by the University of Kent’s AA. The credential is 
also valid for accessing staff resources at the University of Kent. 
However, the credential is not valid if used via eduroam to access 
staff resources at the University of London (yet it remains 
authentic).  
2. Credential validity is determined by the target domain. The 
above discussion leads onto the second problem that needs to be 
addressed in any solution, and this is that there are potentially 
multiple domains within an authorisation infrastructure. There are 
issuing domains, which issue credentials, and target domains that 
consume credentials. The CVS is part of the target domain, and as 
such it must use the policy of the target domain to decide whether a 
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credential is to be trusted or not i.e. is valid or not. So the validity 
of an authorisation credential is ultimately determined by the 
(writer of the) CVS policy. A valid credential is a credential that is 
trusted by the consumer of the credential. 
3. Multiple trusted credential issuers. In any system of any 
significant size, there will be multiple credential issuers. Some of 
these will be trusted by the target domain, others will not be. Thus 
the system must be capable of differentiating between trusted and 
untrusted issuers, and of dynamically obtaining this information 
from somewhere. (In point 4 below we propose to use roots of 
trust.) Different target domains in the same system may trust 
different issuers, and therefore the CVSs must be capable of being 
flexibly configured via their policies to say which issuers are 
trusted and which are not. For example, in the physical world of 
shopping with credit cards, there are several issuers such as Amex 
and Visa. Some shopkeepers accept (trust) both issuers, others only 
trust one of them. It is their (the target domain’s) decision which 
card issuers to trust. 
4. Identifying roots of trust. Point 3 above leads us to conclude that 
the CVS must be configured, in an out of band trusted way, with at 
least one authorization (or Privilege Management Infrastructure –
PMI) root of trust and it is from these PMI roots of trust that all 
credentials must be validated in order to be trusted. A PMI root of 
trust must be a single entity identified directly or indirectly by its 
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public key3, since this key will be used to validate the signed 
credentials that are received. Note that it is not possible to refer to a 
PMI root of trust through its set of assigned attributes, e.g. anyone 
with a project manager attribute and company X attribute, since 
these attributes may identify several candidate roots, and may be 
issued by several attribute authorities, in which case it wont be 
known who to trust. This implies that a higher authority is the real 
PMI root of trust, the one who issues the set of attributes that can be 
trusted. 
5. The role of the Issuer’s policy. Most issuers will have an Issuing 
Policy that states its rules for issuing credentials and places 
constraints on the use of the issued credentials. This policy will 
include any delegation policy to say which delegates are allowed to 
act as delegators and delegate which credentials to which users. 
Consequently there will be constraints on which credentials are 
deemed to be valid for which purposes within and without the 
issuing domain. However, the target domain may choose to ignore 
these constraints and trust (treat as valid) credentials which the 
issuer deems to be invalid. A well known example in the physical 
world concerns supermarkets who issue their own discount 
coupons. These coupons state quite clearly that they are only valid 
for use in supermarkets owned by the issuer. However, it is often 
                                                 
3 When an X.509 conformant PKI is used which already has its own configured CA root public 
keys, the globally unique name of the subject in the PKI certificate can be used to refer to the 
authorization root of trust, instead of the public key in the certificate, in which case the 
subject will be trusted regardless of which public/private key pair it is currently using. 
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the case that a different brand of supermarket will accept these 
discount coupons as a way of enticing the other supermarkets’ 
customers to come and shop in their own supermarket. Thus the 
CVS must have a way of either conforming to or overriding the 
issuer’s policy. If a target domain chooses to ignore the issuer’s 
policy, then it is liable for any losses incurred by this. The issuer 
cannot be held responsible for targets that ignore its Issuing Policy. 
6. Obtaining the Issuing Policy. In a multi-domain system, the target 
domain may not be aware of the issuing domain’s Issuing Policy, 
unless it is explicitly placed into the issued credentials. If the 
complete Issuing Policy is not explicitly placed in the issued 
credentials, but the target domain still wishes to enforce it and only 
treat as valid those credentials that the issuer says are valid, then the 
target’s CVS will need to infer or be configured with the issuer’s 
Issuing Policy. For example, in SPKI [7], a credential is marked as 
being infinity delegatable or not, and does not contain any other 
details of the Issuing Policy, such as who is entitled to be delegated 
the permission. Thus unless a delegatable credential explicitly 
contains restrictions, or out of band means are used to transfer 
them, the target CVS will infer than anyone is entitled to be 
delegated this credential. 
7. Pulling credentials. The CVS may not have all the credentials it 
needs in order to validate the credential(s) presented by the user, 
e.g. if only the credential of a sink node in a delegation DAG is 
presented, but none of the intermediate node credentials are 
presented. In the most extreme case the user may not present any 
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credentials at all, for example, when a user logs into a portal and the 
portal displays only the services this user is allowed to see, the 
portal has, unknown to the user, retrieved the user’s credential(s) 
from a repository in order to determine which services to display. 
There is thus a strong requirement for the CVS to be able to pull 
credentials before the PDP can make access control decisions. 
8. Discovering credential locations. The user’s credentials may be 
stored and/or issued in a variety of places, for example, each AA 
may store the attributes or the credentials it issues in its own 
repository. One could always mandate that the user collects 
together the credentials he wants to use, before attempting to gain 
access to a resource e.g. as in the VOMS model [13]. Alternatively 
the user could send references to the locations of the credentials 
rather than the credentials themselves. Both of these models have 
their merits, but they are not always very user friendly. In fact, in 
some cases, the user may not be aware what credentials have 
actually been issued to him or where they are stored – he might 
only know what services he is allowed to access, as in the portal 
example given above. Thus, in addition to being pushed credentials 
the CVS must also be capable of contacting different 
repositories/AAs in order to pull the user’s credentials prior to 
making its access control decision. 
9. Multiple user identities.  If the user is known by different 
identities to the different AAs, then there must be a way for the user 
to use these mixed credentials in the same session. The GridShib 
project currently uses a mapping table to convert between X.509 
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PKI identities and Shibboleth identity provider identities [14]. But a 
more flexible approach is needed, in which the user may determine 
which set of credentials are to be used in a given session and the 
CVS can prove the user’s right to assert each one. We propose one 
solution to this in [20]. 
10. Multiple credential formats. Following on from above, the user’s 
credentials may be created in different formats and stored in 
different repositories, and therefore presented to the CVS in 
different ways, e.g. as signed SAML assertions [2], as X.509 
attribute certificates [3], as Shibboleth encoded attributes [4] etc. 
The CVS needs to be able to decode and handle credentials in 
different formats. In [25] the authors propose a Credential 
Conversion System (CCS) to handle this problem, by the CCS re-
issuing credentials in the local format. However this changes the 
trust model by introducing trust in the CCS rather than trust in the 
credential issuer. We prefer to keep to the original trust model 
where credentials are issued by their authoritative sources. 
11. Hierarchies of attributes. The attributes may form some sort of 
hierarchy, for example in accordance with the ANSI RBAC 
specification [5], in which the superior attributes (or roles) inherit 
the permissions of the subordinate roles. The CVS needs to be 
aware of this hierarchy when validating the credentials. For 
example, if a superior role holder delegates a subordinate role to 
another user, then the CVS needs to know if this delegation is valid 
or not, given that the attributes are different. Furthermore some of 
the attributes known to the CVS won’t form a hierarchy. Therefore 
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the CVS needs to be able to cater for multiple disjoint attribute 
hierarchies. 
12. Constraining credential validity. Only part of an authentic 
credential might be valid in a target domain. For example, a 
credential might contain multiple attributes but the target domain 
only trusts the issuer to issue a subset of the enclosed attributes. 
13. Understanding and differentiating attributes. If each credential 
issuer puts its own proprietary attributes into its credentials, no 
other VO partner will be able to understand and use them. But for 
inter domain authorisation, remotely issued attributes need to be 
understood by the receiving domain. There are two possible 
solutions to this problem: standard attributes and attribute mappings 
both of which are described below.  
 
The function of attribute mappings is to map external (unknown) 
attributes into internally known ones. With this approach the unique 
combination of issuer, attribute type and attribute value are mapped 
into a locally understood attribute value or role, and the remote users 
with these credentials inherit the permissions that are granted to the 
local attribute value or role. Of course, this requires the mapping 
function to be configured with knowledge of these unknown attributes 
so that correct mappings can be performed, but this is a tractable 
problem.  
 
The alternative approach to attribute mappings is to define a common 
set of standard attributes. This allows the attributes that are issued by 
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every issuing domain to be understood by each receiving domain. This 
is a feasible approach for federations. Perhaps the most extreme 
example of this are credit cards such as Visa. Visa cards (a plastic 
credential) are issued by hundreds of different issuing banks, but all 
contain the same Visa logo (attribute) and all are treated as being equal 
by the relying parties, regardless of the issuer. The US academic 
community also adopted this approach some years ago, by defining the 
EDU person schema [6], which is a collection of standard attribute 
types, and in some cases (for the affiliation attributes) standard values 
as well. However, in the general case it will never be possible to define 
standard sets of values for all attributes that will provide sufficiently 
fine grained access control both for and between all organisations in a 
VO. Locally defined values of standard attributes will become the 
differentiating factor for fine grained control. In order to prevent 
clashes of attribute values, Internet 2 defined a standard encoding 
format for values to provide them with global uniqueness so that no 
two organisations should issue the same value for attributes which are 
inherently different. However, not all organisations may conform to 
these uniqueness rules, and there is no way of enforcing it. Thus 
standard attributes on their own can never fully resolve the problem of 
understanding and differentiating between attributes. For example, 
suppose most organisations in the world issue a standard Project 
Manager attribute to their project managers. In a VO between 
organisations A and B, the CVS policy for organisation B might only 
trust the Project Manager attributes issued by itself, and not those 
issued by organisation A (or by C or D or any other organisation). Or 
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alternatively it might wish to downgrade those issued by organisation A 
and treat them as being equivalent to a guest user attribute. Or it might 
decide to trust the project managers from A as being equal to its own 
project managers. Thus some form of attribute mapping may still be 
required even when standard attributes are used. 
 
In conclusion, the CVS’s policy needs to be flexible enough to cater for 
all the above requirements, including the ability to perform attribute 
mappings. 
3 Architecting a Solution 
Given the problem statements and various requirements from above, 
one can see that all these new functional requirements cannot be met by 
existing PDPs. Consequently, we have proposed a new conceptual 
component called the Credential Validation Service (CVS), whose 
purpose is to perform the new functionality. In essence the purpose of 
the CVS is to validate a set of credentials for a subject, issued in 
different formats by multiple dynamic attribute authorities from 
different domains, according to the local policy, and return a set of 
valid attributes. How this conceptual component is merged into the 
XACML infrastructure will be described later. There are several 
reasons for making the CVS a separate component to the XACML 
PDP. Firstly, its purpose is to perform a distinct function from the PDP. 
The purpose of the PDP is to answer the question “given this access 
control policy, and this subject (with this set of valid attributes), does it 
have the right to perform this action (with this set of attributes) on this 
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target (with this set of attributes)” to which the answer is essentially a 
Boolean, Yes or No4. The purpose of the CVS on the other hand is to 
perform the following “given this credential validation policy, and this 
set of (possibly delegated) credentials, please return the set of valid 
attributes for this entity” to which the answer will be a subset of the 
attributes in the presented credentials, possibly mapped into locally 
known and trusted attributes. Secondly, the XACML language is 
incapable of specifying credential chains and therefore handling 
delegated credentials in a request context. This is because subjects and 
attribute issuers are identified differently in the language (subjects are 
identified by any attributes of any data type whilst the attribute issuer is 
an optional string), hence it is not possible to chain delegated 
credentials together. 
 
When architecting a solution there are several things we need to do. 
Firstly we need a trust model that will tell the CVS which credential 
issuers and policy issuers to trust. Secondly we need to define a 
credential validation policy that will control the trust evaluation of the 
credentials, including mapping the validated attributes into locally 
known attributes. Finally we need to define the functional components 
that comprise the CVS. 
 
                                                 
4 XACML also supports other answers: indeterminate (meaning an error) and not applicable 
(meaning no applicable policy), but these are conceptually other forms of No or Don’t Know. 
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3.1 The Trust Model 
The CVS needs to be provided with a trusted master credential 
validation policy5. We assume that this credential validation policy will 
be provided by the Policy Administration Point (PAP), which is the 
conceptual entity from the XACML specification that is responsible for 
creating policies. If there is a trusted communications channel between 
the PAP and the CVS, then the policy can be provided to the CVS 
through this channel. If the channel is not trusted, or the policy is stored 
in an intermediate repository, then the policy should be digitally signed 
by a trusted policy author, and the CVS configured with the public key 
(or distinguished name if X.509 certificates are being used) of the 
policy author. In addition, if the PAP or repository, has several 
different credential validation policies available to it, that are designed 
to be used at different times and under different conditions, then the 
CVS needs to be told which policy to use. In this way the CVS can be 
assured of being configured with the correct credential validation 
policy. All other information about which sub policies, credential 
issuers and their respective policies to trust can be written into this 
master credential validation policy by the policy author. 
 
In a distributed environment we will have many issuing authorities, 
each with their own issuing policies provided by their own PAPs. If the 
policy author decides that his CVS will abide by these issuing policies 
                                                 
5 Note that whilst we refer to the policy in the singular, we acknowledge that it will contain 
multiple policy statements, and therefore may be regarded as a set of policies.   
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there needs to be a way of securely obtaining them. Possible ways are 
that the CVS could be given read access to the remote PAPs, or the 
remote issuing authorities could be given write access to the local PAP, 
or more realistically, the issuing policies can be bound to their issued 
credentials and obtained dynamically during credential validation. 
Whichever way is used, the issuing policies should be digitally signed 
by their respective issuers so that the CVS can evaluate their 
authenticity. If the issuing policies are bound to the credentials, then a 
single signature over all the information will suffice.  
 
The policy author may decide to completely ignore all the issuer’s 
policies (see section 2 point 5), or to use them in combination with his 
own credential validation policy, or to use them in place of his own 
policy. Thus this information (or policy combining rule) needs to be 
conveyed as part of the CVS’s policy. 
3.2.The Credential Validation Policy 
The CVS’s policy needs to comprise the following components: 
- a list of trusted credential issuers. These are the issuers in the local 
and remote domains who are trusted to issue credentials that are valid 
in the local domain. They are the roots of trust. This list is needed so 
that the signatures on credentials and policies can be validated. The list 
could contain the raw public keys of the issuers or it could refer to them 
by their X.500 distinguished names or their X.509 public key 
certificates. 
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- the hierarchical relationships of the various sets of attributes. All 
attributes need to be included in this hierarchy; both externally defined 
ones and internally understood ones. Some attributes, such as roles, 
form a natural hierarchy. Other attributes, such as file permissions 
might also form one e.g. all permissions is superior to read, write and 
delete; and write is superior to append and delete. Other attributes 
usually will not e.g. the names of organisations. When an attribute 
holder delegates a subordinate attribute to another entity, the credential 
validation service needs to understand the hierarchical relationship and 
whether the delegation is valid or not. For example, if a holder with a 
manager role delegates the administrator role to someone, is this a valid 
delegation or not? The relationship of manager to administrator in the 
attribute hierarchy will provide the answer to this question. 
 
Figure 1. An example Delegation Directed Acyclic Graph 
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- a description (schema) of the valid delegation graph. The process of 
delegation forms a directed acyclic graph (DAG), with the initial PMI 
roots of trust as the sources of the graph (see Figure 1). Intermediate 
nodes in the graph represent delegates who subsequently act as 
delegators and further delegate their attributes (or permissions) to 
others. Sink nodes represent delegates who have not further delegated 
their attributes (or permissions) to others. Edges in the graph represent 
the attributes or permissions that have been delegated from the 
delegator to the delegate. Successor edges must always represent the 
same or less attributes and permissions than the union of their 
predecessor edges, otherwise a delegator will have delegated more 
privileges than he himself possessed. The graph is acyclic because a 
delegator should not be able to delegate to herself or to a predecessor 
(e.g. edges 14 and 17 in Figure 1). Rationally, there is a reason for this, 
a delegate should never need to delegate to an entity that previously 
delegated directly or indirectly to it. But there is also a security reason 
for this. There is a potential security loophole if a delegator, who is 
allowed to delegate a privilege but not to assert it, does subsequently 
delegate it to herself, then she would be able to assert the delegated 
privilege. This CVS policy component describes how the CVS can 
determine if a chain of delegated credentials and/or policies falls within 
a trusted graph or not. This is obviously a complex policy component. 
One way of simplifying it, is to restrict the directed graph into being a 
delegation tree, or set of trees, in which there is only one source or PMI 
root node for each tree which holds the set of attributes that it can 
delegate, and each act of delegation creates a separate delegate 
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subordinate node. If a delegate receives attributes from two or more 
delegators in separate acts of delegation, such as edges 7 and 12 in 
Figure 1, then these are represented as separate edges and nodes in the 
tree, without merging the delegate nodes together. Figure 2 shows how 
the DAG of Figure1 might be simplified into two delegation trees. 
Delegation trees significantly simplify the process of credential 
validation and credential revocation because each credential only has a 
single parent. Even then, there is no widely accepted standard way of 
describing delegation trees. One approach can be found in X.509 [3] 
and a different approach in [9]. The essential elements however should 
specify who is allowed to be in each tree (both as an issuer and/or a 
subject), what attributes they can validly have (assert) and delegate, and 
what constraints apply. 
 
Figure 2. An example set of Delegation Trees 
 
24       David W Chadwick, Sassa Otenko and Tuan Anh Nguyen 
- any validity constraints on the various credentials (e.g. time 
constraints or target constraints). The CVS’s policy may place its own 
constraints on credential validity regardless of those of the issuer. 
Consider for example time constraints. An issuer gives each issued 
credential a validity period, which may range from fairly short (e.g. 
minutes) to very long (e.g. several years). The primary reason for 
issuing short lived certificates (for other than intrinsically short lived 
permissions) is so that they do not need to be revoked, and therefore the 
relying party does not need to consult revocation lists, white lists, or 
OCSP servers etc. In the case of relatively long lived credentials, the 
CVS policy author may have his own opinion about which credentials 
to trust, from a chronological perspective, and therefore may wish to 
place his own additional time constraints on remotely issued 
credentials. For example, a plumber may have a “certified plumber” 
credential, which is valid for 10 years from the date of issue. He may 
be required to pass a competence test every ten years to prove that he is 
conversant with the latest technology developments and quality 
standards before the credential is renewed. However, in the target 
domain, the CVS policy author may decide that he does not want to 
accept anyone with a credential that is newer than one year old, due to 
insufficient experience on the job, or is more than 8 years old, due to 
doubts about competencies with the latest technologies. Consequently 
the CVS must be told what the local constraints are on credential 
validity. 
- the attribute mapping policy that maps externally defined attributes 
into ones known by the local PDP and used in its access control rules. 
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- finally, we need a disjunctive/conjunctive directive (or policy 
combining rule) to say how to intersect the issuer’s policy with the 
CVS’s own policy. The options are: only the issuer’s issuing and 
delegation policy should take effect, or only the CVS’s policy should 
take effect, or both should take effect and valid credentials must 
conform to both policies. 
 
Note that when dynamic delegation of authority is not being supported, 
the above policy can still be used in a simplified form to support static 
delegation of authority. In this case the delegation trees reduce to one 
level hierarchies, in which the root nodes are the (static) set of trusted 
issuers and the first level nodes are the set of delegates who can be 
issued with credentials. In this case the CVS’s policy now controls 
which trusted issuers are allowed to assign which attributes to which 
subjects, along with the various constraints and disjunctive/conjunctive 
directive, but the subjects are not allowed to delegate further. 
 
XACMLv2 [8] or its RBAC profile [21] are not suitable instruments to 
express Credential Validation Policies. As the RBAC profile states 
“The policies specified in this profile do not answer the question “What 
set of roles does subject X have?” That question must be handled by a 
Role Enablement Authority, and not directly by an XACML PDP”. The 
current working draft of XACMLv3 [18] is not suitable either. An 
important requirement for multi-domain dynamic delegation is the 
ability to accept only part of an asserted credential. This means that the 
policy should be expressive enough to specify what is the maximum 
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acceptable set of attributes that can be issued by one Issuer to a Subject, 
and the evaluation mechanism must be able to compute the intersection 
of this with those that the Subject’s credential asserts. The approaches 
used by XACML can only state that an asserted set of attributes or 
policies is fully accepted, or fully rejected. In [18] the delegation is 
deemed to be valid if the issuer of the delegated policy could have 
performed the request that the policy grants to the delegatee. We think 
this is a serious deficiency, which lies at the core of the XACML policy 
evaluation process.  We think it is a limitation on an independent 
issuing domain to have to take into account all the policies that the 
validating domains support, so that only fully acceptable sets of 
credentials or policies can be issued to its subjects. Our model is based 
on full independence of the issuing domain from the validating 
domains. In general it is impossible for a validating domain to fully 
accept an arbitrary set of credentials from an issuing domain, since the 
issuing and validating policies will not match. It is not always possible 
for the issuing domain to tell in advance in what context a subject’s 
credentials will be used (unless new credentials are issued every time a 
subject requests access to a resource) so it is not possible to tell in 
advance what validation policy will be applied to them. 
 
Having identified this problem, we propose a solution that uses a non-
XACML based credential validation policy first, and an XACML 
policy next for access control decision making that uses the delegated 
attributes that have been validated by the CVS’s policy. 
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3.2.1 Formal Credential Validation Policy 
We define a Credential Validation Policy as an unordered set of tuples 
<S, I, C, E>, where S is a set of Subjects to whom any Issuer from set I 
can assign at most a set of Credentials C, but only if any of the 
conditions in set E holds true: 
CVP = {<S, I, C, E>} 
We define the Credential Validation process as a process of obtaining a 
subset of valid credentials V, given an asserted set of credentials c, 
issued by issuer i to the subject s, if condition e holds true at the time of 
evaluation:  
V = { c∩C | c∩C≠∅, s⊆S, i⊆I, e⊆E, <S, I, C, E>⊆CVP } 
Note that in XACML the only possible evaluation of a Credential 
Validation process is:  
V = { c | c⊆C, s⊆S, i⊆I, e⊆E, <S, I, C, E>⊆CVP } 
Further, we define a dynamic delegation process as a process of 
obtaining a set R of Credential Validation rules for intermediate issuers, 
i.e. the issuers on the path from the policy writer to the end user, where 
the intermediate issuer s is issued a set of Credentials c by a higher 
level issuer i, subject to condition e and a constraint on subject domain 
d: 
Rs = { <d∩S\s, s, c∩C, e> | c∩C≠∅, s⊆S, i⊆I, e⊆E, 
<S, I, C, E>⊆CVP∪Ri } 
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Thus the issuer i can allow the issuer s to delegate a subset of his own 
permissions to a subset of his own set of subjects, subject to the 
condition e being stricter than that imposed on i.  Note the recursive 
nature of the process - the tuple <S, I, C, E> must belong to the CVP or 
to the set of valid rules for issuer i. Note also that loops in the 
delegation are prohibited by excluding the holder of the rule from the 
set of possible subjects. XACML currently lacks the expressiveness for 
deriving new Credential Validation rules given the set of existing rules 
and valid credentials. 
3.3 The CVS functional components 
Figure 3 illustrates the architecture of the CVS function and the general 
flow of information and sequence of events. First of all the service is 
initialised by giving it the credential validation policy (step 0). Now the 
CVS can be queried for the valid attributes of an entity (step 1). 
Between the request for attributes and returning them (steps 1 and 6) 
the following events may occur a number of times, as necessary i.e. the 
CVS is capable of recursively calling itself as it determines the path in 
a delegation tree from a given node to a PMI root of trust. The Policy 
Enforcer requests credentials from a Credential Provider (step 2). When 
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operating in credential pull mode, the credentials are dynamically 
 
Figure 3. Data Flow Diagram for Credential Validation Service Architecture 
 
pulled from one or more remote credential providers (these could be 
AA servers, LDAP repositories etc.). The actual attribute request 
protocol (e.g. SAML or LDAP) is handled by a Credential Retriever 
module. When operating in credential push mode, the CVS client stores 
the already obtained credentials in a local credential provider repository 
and pushes the repository to the CVS, so that the CVS can operate in 
logically the same way for both push and pull modes. After credential 
retrieval, the Credential Retriever module passes the credentials to a 
decoding module (step 3). From here they undergo the first stage of 
validation – credential authentication (step 4). Because only the 
Credential Decoder is aware of the actual format of the credentials, it 
has to be responsible for authenticating the credentials using an 
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appropriate Credential Authenticator module. Consequently, both the 
Credential Decoder and Credential Authenticator modules are encoding 
specific modules. For example, if the credentials are digitally signed 
X.509 attribute certificates, the Credential Authenticator uses the 
configured X.509 PKI to validate the signatures. If the credentials are 
XML signed SAML attribute assertions, then the Credential 
Authenticator uses the public key in the SAML assertion to validate the 
signature. The Credential Decoder subsequently discards all credentials 
that are deemed by the Authenticator module to be unauthentic – these 
are ones whose digital signatures are invalid, either cryptography or 
because the signer’s certificate cannot be traced to a PKI root of trust, 
or because the signer’s certificate has been revoked. Authentic 
credentials on the other hand are decoded and transformed into an 
implementation specific local format that the Policy Enforcer is able to 
handle (step 5). 
 
The task of the Policy Enforcer is to decide if each authentic credential 
is valid (i.e. trusted) or not. It does this by referring to its Credential 
Validation policy to see if the credential has been issued by a PMI root 
of trust or not. If it has, it is valid. If it has not, the Policy Enforcer has 
to work its way up the delegation tree (or graph) from the current 
credential to its issuer, and from there to its issuer, recursively, until a 
PMI root of trust is located, or no further issuers can be found (in which 
case the credential is not trusted and is discarded). Consequently steps 
2-5 are recursively repeated until closure is reached. Even when the 
delegation graph has been simplified to a set of delegation trees, in the 
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general case there will be multiple trees each with their own PMI root 
of trust, who each may have their own Issuing Policy, which may have 
been further restricted by their delegates, which may then need to be 
adhered to or not by the Policy Enforcer according to the CVS’s policy. 
There are also issues of height first or breadth first upwards tree 
walking, or top-down vs. bottom-up tree walking. These are primarily 
implementation rather than conceptual issues, as they effect 
performance and quality of service, and so we will address them further 
in Section 6 where we describe our implementation of a CVS.  
 
The proposed architecture makes sure that the CVS can:  
• Retrieve credentials from a variety of physical resources 
• Decode the credentials from a variety of encoding formats 
• Authenticate and perform integrity checks specific to the 
credential encoding format 
All this is necessary because realistically there is no way that all of 
these will fully match between truly independent issuing domains and 
the validating domain. 
4 The XACML Model 
Figure 4 shows the overall conceptual set of interactions, as described 
in XACMLv2 [8]. The PDP is initially loaded with the XACML policy 
prior to any user’s requests being received (step 1). The user’s access 
request is intercepted by the PEP (step 2), is authenticated, and any 
pushed credentials are validated and the attributes extracted (note that 
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this is not within the scope of the XACML standard). The request and 
user attributes (in local format) are forwarded to the context handler 
(step 3), which may ask the PIP for additional attributes (steps 6 to 8) 
before passing the request to the PDP (step 4). If the PDP determines 
from the policy that additional attributes are still needed, it may ask the 
context handler for them (step 5). Optionally the context handler may 
also forward resource content (step 9) along with the additional 
attributes (step 10) to the PDP. The PDP makes a decision and returns 
it via the context handler (step 11) to the PEP (step 12). If the decision 
contains optional obligations they will be enforced by the obligations 
service (step 12).  
 
As can be seen from Figure 4, XACMLv2 currently has nothing to say 
about credentials or how they are validated. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Data Flow Diagram for XACML Architecture 
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5 Incorporating the CVS into XACML 
Figure 5. Incorporating the CVS by directly calling it from the PEP 
 
Figure 6. Incorporating the CVS as an additional module called by the XACML Context 
handler 
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Figures 5, 6 and 7 show the three possible ways in which the CVS 
could be incorporated into the XACML model. The CVS could be an 
additional component called by either the PEP (step 101 in Figure 5) or 
the context handler (step 103 in Figure 6), or it could completely 
replace the PIP (step 6 in Figure 7). 
 
The primary advantage of having the CVS called by the PEP (Figure 
5), is that existing XACMLv2 implementations do not need to change. 
Furthermore some PEPs, such as Globus Toolkitv4 [27], already 
implement this model. When GT4 is pushed a complete set of 
credentials, it makes a call-out to an external plug-in to process them 
before calling the PDP. When called by the PEP, the CVS is either 
passed a complete bag of credentials (push mode), or it fetches all the 
credentials it needs (pull mode), or a mixture of the two modes occurs 
 
Figure 7. Incorporating the CVS as a replacement for the XACML PIP module 
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and the CVS pulls the additional attributes that it needs to supplement 
those pushed by the PEP. In all cases the CVS returns the valid set of 
subject attributes to the PEP, which the latter can then pass to the 
existing XACML context handler. The primary disadvantage of this 
model is that each application will need to be modified in order to 
utilise the CVS, since the PEP is an application dependent component 
of the authorisation infrastructure. Note that this model, when operating 
in push mode only, with no credential retrievals, is similar to that being 
proposed by the WS-Trust specification, in which the Security Token 
Service (STS) operates as a token validation service [10]. However, the 
STS has no equivalent functionality of the CVS operating in credential 
pull mode. 
 
The advantage of having the CVS called by the context handler is that 
many existing applications i.e. the PEPs, will not need to change. If 
subject credentials can be packaged like subject attributes and hence 
relayed transparently from the access requestor to the context handler, 
or the CVS operates in pull mode, then a PEP can call an enhanced 
context handler without needing to be modified. The only change that 
will be needed is to the context handler component of an XACML 
implementation. Support for multiple autonomous domains that each 
support delegation of authority can be added to applications without 
either the application logic or the context handler interface needing to 
change. Only a new credential validation policy is needed. Credentials 
that were previously invalid (because they had been delegated) would 
now become valid, once the appropriate policy is added to the PAP.  
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The advantage of completely replacing the PIP by the CVS, is that we 
have the opportunity of using digitally signed credentials for 
constructing target attributes and environmental attributes as well as 
subject attributes. For example, time may be obtained from a secure 
time stamping authority as a digitally signed credential (step 4b in 
Figure 7), and validated according to the CVS’s policy. The 
disadvantage of the last two approaches is that incorporating the CVS 
inside the policy evaluator introduces transforms to the request context 
that are invisible to the PEP.  
 
At the current time we do not know which approach will eventually be 
favored. Consequently in our implementation we support two modes of 
operation: the CVS called directly by the PEP and the CVS called by 
the XACML context handler. We have also specified two Open Grid 
Forum profiles for the protocol interactions between a PEP and an 
enhanced context handler/PDP [22] and a PEP and a CVS [23] so that 
credentials can be transparently processed by XACML applications. 
Note that the mode of operation does not affect the implementation of 
the CVS, which is explained in the next section. 
6  Implementing the CVS 
There are a number of challenges involved in building a fully 
functional CVS that is flexible enough to support the multiple 
requirements outlined in section 2. Firstly we need to fully specify the 
Credential Validation Policy, including the rules for constructing 
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delegation graphs (or multiple trees). Then we have to engineer the 
policy enforcer with an appropriate algorithm that can efficiently 
navigate the delegation graph (or a tree) and determine whether a 
subject’s credentials are valid or not. In our implementation we have 
chosen to constrain the delegation DAG into a set of delegation trees, 
with each tree having a single PMI root of trust. The output from the 
CVS is a set of valid attributes encoded in XACML format ready for 
passing to the PDP. 
6.1 Credential Validation Policy 
We have implemented our CVS policy in XML, according to the 
schema shown in Appendix 1. Most components of the policy are 
relatively straightforward to define, apart from the delegation trees. We 
have specified the list of trusted credential issuers (PMI roots of trust) 
by using either their subject distinguished names (DNs) or their 
subjectAltName Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) from their X.509 
public key certificates. Only the latter subjectAltName is supported 
since this is the naming scheme used by all entities on the world wide 
web. We chose to use DNs or URLs rather than public keys for two 
reasons. Firstly, they are easier for policy writers to understand and 
handle, and secondly it makes the policy independent of the current key 
pair that happens to be in use by a trusted issuer. The authorisation 
policy is therefore independent of the underlying PKI. 
 
Multiple disjoint attribute hierarchies are supported. Each attribute 
hierarchy is specified by listing superior-subordinate attribute value 
Comment [DWC1]: Add 
credential decoding 
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pairs. This allows any arbitrary partial order to be created, since there is 
no limit to the number of times a particular attribute value can occur as 
either a superior or a subordinate value in one hierarchy (subject to the 
restriction that loops are not created). Attributes and attribute values 
can be independent of any hierarchy if so wished, so that permission 
inheritance does not have to be supported if it is not required. 
 
Delegation trees have each been defined as a name space (a delegation 
domain), a delegation depth and a root of trust. Anyone in the 
delegation domain who is given a credential by the designated root of 
trust may delegate it to anyone else in the same domain, who in turn 
may delegate it to anyone else in the same domain until the delegation 
depth is reached.  X.500/LDAP distinguished names or HTTP URLs 
are used to define the delegation domains. A base DN or URL is used 
to specify the root node of the delegation domain, and the domain may 
be refined by defining included and excluded subtrees so that any 
arbitrary subtree may be constructed.  All delegates must belong to the 
refined domain otherwise the delegation is not valid. Since we already 
refer to the credential issuers (roots of trust) by their LDAP DNs or 
URLs, it was natural to refer to the delegates in a delegation tree by 
their DNs or URLs as well. In this way we can easily link delegation 
chains together by matching the issuer in one certificate with the 
subject in the next certificate in the chain. We recognise that a more 
flexible approach to defining delegation trees is by referring to 
delegates by their attributes rather than their DNs or URLs, as for 
example as used by Bandmann et al [9]. Their delegation tree model 
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allows a policy writer to specify delegation trees such as “anyone with 
a head of department attribute may delegate a project manager attribute 
to any member of staff in the department”. This is a future planned 
enhancement to our work. It introduces a level of indirection and 
complexity whereby one has to retrieve a delegate or delegator’s 
credentials, extract their attributes from this, see if they have an 
attribute that matches the one in the delegation rule, and then validate 
that this attribute was correctly assigned or delegated in the credential 
according to its governing rule. This adds a level of complexity that our 
current model does not have, since in our current model we simply 
need to match on the delegate or delegator’s name.  
 
One obvious constraint that we place on our delegation trees is that the 
same attribute value (or one of its subordinate values in the role 
hierarchy) must be propagated down any given tree from the root of 
trust, and either new unrelated attributes that are not in the same role 
hierarchy, or superior values from the same role hierarchy, cannot be 
introduced in the middle of a delegation tree. This is to ensure that a 
delegator can only delegate his existing permissions or a subset of 
them, and not an unrelated set or superset. A new delegation tree would 
need to be specified for the delegation of an unrelated or superior 
attribute. 
 
Trusted issuers and delegation domains are defined separately in the 
policy and then linked together with the attributes that each issuer is 
trusted to issue, along with any additional time/validity constraints that 
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are placed on the issued credentials. (The constraints have not been 
shown in the schema.) The reason for doing this is improved flexibility, 
since one trusted issuer may be the root of several delegation trees, and 
one delegation domain may have several roots of trust. 
 
In our current implementation we do not pass the full Issuing Policy 
along with the issued credential, we only pass the tree depth integer, 
since this was already an X.509 standard extension. Therefore the CVS 
does not know what the issuer’s intended delegation tree is. We have 
assumed that the credential issuing software at the issuing site will 
enforce the Issuing Policy and so only credentials that conform to the 
Issuing Policy will be issued. However, the CVS policy writer is able to 
specify his own delegation domain for the received credentials and this 
may be more restrictive than that of the issuing domain, or the same as 
or less restrictive than it. So ultimately the owner of the resource will 
control the delegation tree that is deemed to be valid at the target site. 
In order to ensure that the Issuing Policy is enforced at the target site 
the issuer’s delegation tree should be configured into the CVS’s policy. 
This assumes that the structure of the issuer’s delegation tree is the 
same as that of our CVS policy, which will not always be the case in 
independent domains using different models and software 
implementations. A future planned enhancement is to carry the 
complete Issuing Policy in each issued credential, and to allow the 
CVS’s policy writer to enforce it, or overwrite it with his own policy, 
or force conformance to both. In this way a more sophisticated 
delegation tree can be adhered to. This of course will depend upon 
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there being a standardised format for the transfer of Issuing Policies in 
credentials, which currently there is not for either SAML attribute 
assertions or X.509 or SPKI certificates. 
6.2 Delegation Tree Navigation 
Given a subject’s credential, the CVS needs to create a path between it 
and a root of trust, or if no path can be found, conclude that the 
credential cannot be trusted. There are two alternative conceptual ways 
of creating this path, either top-down, also known as backwards [3, 17] 
(i.e. start at a root of trust and work down the delegation tree to all the 
leaves until the subject’s credentials are found) or bottom-up, also 
known as forwards (i.e. start with the subject’s credential and work up 
the delegation tree until you arrive at its root of trust).  Neither 
approach is without its difficulties. Either way can fail if all the 
credentials are not pushed to the CVS. If the CVS has to pull 
credentials from the issuers or their repositories, then all the credentials 
have to be held consistently – either all with their subjects or all with 
their issuers, otherwise the CVS will not be able to efficiently locate 
them. In our implementation all credentials are held with their subjects, 
typically in their LDAP directory entries, or more recently, in files 
linked to their DNs held in WebDAV repositories [24]. As Li et al 
point out [17], building an authorisation credential chain is more 
difficult in general than building an X.509 public key certificate chain, 
because in the latter one merely has to follow the subject/issuer chain in 
a tree, whereas in the former, a DAG rather than a tree may be 
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encountered. Graphs may arise for example when a superior delegates 
some permissions in a single credential that have been derived from 
two of more credentials that he possesses, or when attribute mappings 
occur between different authorities. Our CVS implementation is 
currently limited to supporting delegation trees rather than DAGs, and 
so it will not follow multiple superior credentials from a single 
subordinate one as these are forbidden. Delegations are also restricted 
to occurring in a single subject domain, and therefore attribute 
mappings will not occur. But even for the simpler PKI certificate 
chains, which our credential chains conform to, there is no best 
direction for validating them. SPKI uses the forwards chaining 
approach [15]. As Elley et al describe in [16], in the X.509 model it all 
depends upon the PKI trust model and the number of policy related 
certificate extensions that are present to aid in filtering out untrusted 
certificates, whether backwards or forwards chaining is preferrable. 
Given that our delegation tree is more similar to a PKI tree, and that we 
do not have the policy controls to filter the top-down (backwards) 
approach, and furthermore, we support multiple roots of trust so in 
general would not know where to start, then the top-down method is 
not appropriate. 
 
There are two ways of performing bottom-up (forwards) validation, 
either height first in which the immediately superior credential only is 
obtained, recursively until the root is reached, or breadth first in which 
all the credentials of the immediate superior are obtained, and then all 
the credentials of their issuers are obtained recursively until the root or 
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roots are reached. The latter approach may seem counter-intuitive, and 
certainly is not sensible to perform in real time in a large scale system, 
however a variant of it may be necessary in certain cases, i.e. when 
DAGs are supported, or when a superior possesses multiple identical 
credentials issued by different authorities. Furthermore, given that in 
our federation model described in section 2 (point 7) we allow a user to 
simply authenticate to a gateway and for the system to determine what 
the user is authorised to do (the credential pull model), the first step of 
the credential validation process is to fetch all the credentials of the 
user. This is performed by the Credential Retriever in Figure 3. Thus if 
the CVS recursively calls itself, the breadth first approach would be the 
default credential retrieval method. Thus we have added a retrieval 
directive to the credential validation method, which is set to breadth 
first for the initial call to the CVS, and then to height first for 
subsequent recursive calls that the CVS makes to itself.  
 
In order to efficiently solve the problem of finding credentials, we add 
a pointer in each issued credential that points to the location of the 
issuer’s credential(s) which are superior to this one in the delegation 
tree. This pointer is the AuthorityInformationAccess extension defined 
in [19]. Although this pointer is not essential in limited systems that 
have a way of locating all the credential repositories, in the general case 
it is needed. 
 
In order to ensure that a delegator does not overstep his or her 
authority, after retrieving the attribute(s) from the delegator’s credential 
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we need to check that one of them is superior or equal to all the 
attributes in the delegate’s credential in the attribute hierarchy. If it is 
not superior to all of the delegate’s attributes in the attribute hierarchy, 
the delegator has exceeded his authority and the delegate's credential is 
discarded and processing stops. 
 
In the case of relatively long lived credentials, revocation is clearly an 
issue. When a credential has been revoked, then all the credentials in 
the branch of the tree for which the revoked credential is the root, are 
also considered to be revoked. The CVS retrieves the revocation 
information about credentials when determining their validity. If any 
credential between the requestor’s credential and the root of trust has 
been revoked, then the requestor’s credential is considered to be 
invalid, and processing stops. We have also implemented a novel 
scheme for revoking credentials which uses the web as a finite state 
machine to indicate the revocation status of each credential [24]. This 
scheme inherently supports instant revocation and can be more efficient 
than using CRLs.  
 
Finally, as a means of enhanced performance, we envisage that a 
background task could be run when the system is idle, that works its 
way down all the delegation trees from the roots of trust, in a breadth 
first search for credentials, validates them against the CVS’s policy, 
and caches the valid attributes for each user for a configuration period 
of time that is approximately equal to the period of CRL issuance. Then 
when a user attempts to access a resource, the CVS will be able to give 
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much faster responses because the high level branches of the delegation 
tree will have already been validated. 
6.3 Performance Measurements 
The performance measurements were primarily conducted on a Linux 
machine (Intel Pentium(R) D 2.8GHz and 1GB memory) with Globus 
Tool kit 4.0.0 and MySQL installed. The application provided 
distributed access to a grid enabled MySQL database. Users with a 
particular role were granted access to the database. Since Globus 
Toolkit already supports java call outs to PIPs and PDPs, it was a 
relatively straightforward task to implement the PEP direct-call-to CVS 
model (Figure 5), with the CVS acting as a GT4 PIP.  
 
Initially we configured the CVS to operate in attribute pull mode, 
retrieving X.509 attribute certificates from an LDAP server in which all 
the users’ credentials were stored in their LDAP entries. The LDAP 
server ran on a different PC to the database service. They were 
connected via a high speed LAN. We tested attribute certificate chains 
from lengths 1 to 5, with 1 representing a credential issued directly by 
the PMI root of trust.  The complete chain was 
PMI_root→AA1→AA2→AA3→AA4→AA5. No revocation lists 
were issued or processed. 
 
Each set of performance measurements was carried out 100 times and 
the average and standard deviations were computed. Each set of 100 
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results contained several spurious results (between 1 and 6). According 
to Shewhart [28], when a process is in control, approximately 1% 
of the measurements will be greater or less than three times the 
standard deviation, and approximately 5% will be outside two times the 
standard deviation. Usually it was the very first one or two results in 
the set and then several random other ones. We believe that these 
spurious results are due to either java initialization or java garbage 
collection kicking in at random intervals. We removed these from the 
figures presented in the tables below. 
 
Table 1.  CVS pulling all credentials from LDAP Server (ms) 
Delegation 
Chain length 
Average time with 
signature 
verification(ms) 




1 9.44 2.30 5.44 1.75 
2 17.08 3.68 9.49 2.62 
3 24.77 4.81 13.31 3.28 
4 31.96 5.60 16.80 3.82 
5 39.92 6.69 20.25 4.66 
 
The second column shows the average time for verifying a chain of 
attribute certificates. These figures are a combination of several tasks, 
repeated for each AC in the chain, namely: retrieve the AC from 
LDAP, verify its digital signature, and validate its asserted attribute(s) 
against the CVS’s delegation policy. The figures show that as the AC 
chain length increases, the time taken to validate the subject’s attribute 
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increases by approximately 7.6ms for each additional AC in the chain 
between the subject’s AC and the PMI root of trust. If we subtract this 
figure from all the results, for each AC in the chain, we find that the 
fixed CVS overhead time for marshalling arguments and producing a 
response is somewhere between 1.48 and 1.91ms.  
 
In order to determine the time taken to pull an AC from LDAP, we 
configured the CVS to work in attribute push mode, providing the 
complete set of credentials to the CVS with each request. The results 
are shown in Table 2 column 2. To determine the time taken for 
signature verification we switched off the cryptography function for 
both the push and pull modes. These results are presented in the 4th 
columns of Tables 1 and 2. 
  
Table 2.  All credentials pushed to CVS (ms) 
Delegation 
Chain length 
Average time with 
signature 
verification (ms) 





1 6.16 1.55 3.91 1.45 
2 10.67 2.46 6.47 1.96 
3 15.74 3.34 8.92 2.64 
4 19.78 3.59 11.10 3.27 
5 24.70 4.24 13.91 3.66 
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An analysis of columns 2 and 4 in each table reveals that the time taken 
to verify a signature on an attribute certificate pulled from LDAP is 
approximately 3.86±0.1ms, whereas the same task when the attribute 
certificate is pushed to the CVS is just 2.2±0.1ms. The reason for this 
apparent disparity is that the public key certificate of the attribute 
certificate signer also has to be pulled from LDAP in the pull model, 
but since this was pushed to the CVS with the attribute certificates in 
the push model, there was no additional retrieval time in Table 2. We 
can therefore calculate that it takes approximately 1.66ms to retrieve a 
public key certificate from LDAP. When we compare the 4th columns 
of both tables we find that the average time to retrieve an attribute 
certificate from LDAP is 1.44ms (values range from 1.27 to 1.53ms) so 
this figure is close to that computed for retrieving a public key 
certificate. When we compare the 2nd columns of both tables we find 
that the additional time required to pull from LDAP when signatures 
are verified is 3.12ms on average (values range from 3.0 to 3.28). This 
is approximately the sum of the times we have just computed for 
retrieving an attribute certificate and public key certificate from LDAP. 
We don’t believe there is any inherent difference in the time taken to 
retrieve an attribute or public key certificate, and the difference in the 
figures is within the error of measurement. To conclude, we calculate 
that it took approximately 1.55 ms to retrieve a certificate from LDAP 
and 2.2ms to verify the signature on an attribute certificate. We can see 
from table 2 that is takes approximately 3.91ms to parse the attribute 
certificate and verify it against the CVS’s policy. When we add onto 
this the time for signature verification (2.2ms) and two retrievals from 
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LDAP (3.12ms) we get a total time of 9.23ms which is well within the 
standard deviation of the overall time for retrieving and validating an 
attribute certificate pulled from LDAP (9.44ms). 
7 Conclusions and Future Work 
Providing XACML with support for dynamic delegation of authority 
that is enacted via the issuing of credentials from one user to another, is 
a non-trivial task to model and engineer. In this paper we have 
presented the problems and requirements that such a model demands, 
and have architected a solution based on the XACML conceptual and 
data flow models. We have also presented at a conceptual level the 
policy elements that are necessary to support this model of dynamic 
delegation of authority. Given that these policy elements are 
significantly different to those of the existing XACMLv2 policy, and 
that the functionality required to evaluate this policy is significantly 
different to that of the existing XACML PDP, we have proposed a new 
conceptual entity called the Credential Validation Service, to work 
alongside the PDP in the authorisation decision making. The 
advantages of this approach are several. Firstly the XACML policy and 
PDP do not need to change, and support for dynamic delegation of 
authority can be phased in gradually. The exact syntax and semantics of 
the new policy elements can be standardised with time, based on 
implementation experience and user requirements. We have presented 
our first attempt at defining and implementing such a policy, and now 
have an efficient implementation that supports dynamic delegation of 
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authority. A live demonstration is available at 
https://sec.cs.kent.ac.uk/dis.html. 
 
Future work will look at supporting more sophisticated delegation trees 
and schema, and enforcing (or ignoring) Issuing Policies in target 
domains by passing the full policy embedded in the issued credentials. 
We also plan to support the delegation of role-permission assignments 
according to the design presented in [26] and incorporate additional 
policy elements in the delegation trees, such as attribute mappings of 
the kind described in [17]. 
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Appendix 1:  CVS Policy Schema 




<xs:element name="CVSPolicy" type="permis:CVSPolicyType"/> 
    <xs:complexType name="CVSPolicyType" > 
       <xs:sequence> 
          <xs:element name="TrustedIssuers" type="permis:TrustedIssuersType" /> 
          <xs:element name="AttributeHierarchies" 
type="permis:AttributeHierarchiesType" /> 
<xs:element name="Domains" type="permis:DomainsType"/> 
         <xs:element name="AttributeAssignments" 
type="permis:AttributeAssignmentsType" /> 
       </xs:sequence> 
        <xs:attribute name="CVSPolicyID" use="required" type="xs:anyURI"/> 
    </xs:complexType> 
<!-- --> 
<xs:complexType name="TrustedIssuersType"> 
       <xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="TrustedIssuer" maxOccurs="unbounded" 
type="permis:TrustedIssuerType"/> 




<xs:attribute name="TrustedIssuer" use="required" type="xs:anyURI"/> 
  <!-- Only LDAP and HTTP URLs are currently allowed for issuers --> 




       <xs:sequence> 
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<xs:element name="AttributeHierarchy" maxOccurs="unbounded" 
type="permis:AttributeHierarchyType"  /> 





<xs:element name="Superior" type="permis:SuperiorValueType" 
maxOccurs="unbounded" > 
<xs:sequence> 
         <xs:attribute name="AttributeOID" use="required" type="xs:anyURI"/   
   <!-- Must be encoded according to SAML LDAP Profile e.g. urn:oid:1.2.3.4 --> 
 <xs:attribute name="FriendlyName" use="required" type="xs:ID"/ 
</xs:complexType> 
<!-- --> 
 <xs:complexType name="SuperiorValueType"> 
<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="Subordinate" type="permis:SubordinateValueType" 
minOccurs="0" > 
<xs:sequence> 








       <xs:sequence> 
          <xs:element name="Domain" maxOccurs="unbounded" type="permis:DomainType" /> 
        </xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
<!-- --> 
  <xs:complexType name="DomainType"> 
       <xs:sequence> 
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<xs:element name="RootNode" type="permis:RootNodeType" 
maxOccurs="unbounded" 
</xs:sequence> 
         <xs:attribute name="DomainID" use="required" type="xs:ID"/ </xs:complexType> 
<!-- --> 
 <xs:complexType name="RootNodeType"> 
       <xs:sequence> 
<!-- the excluded nodes must be immediately subordinate to the root node. 
Only LDAP and HTTP URLs are currently allowed for nodes --> 
<xs:element name="ExcludedNode" type=" xs:anyURI " minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="unbounded" 
</xs:sequence> 




       <xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="AttributeAssignment" maxOccurs="unbounded" 
type="permis:AttributeAssignmentType"/> 
        </xs:sequence> 
</xs:complexType> 
<!-- --> 
<xs:complexType name="AttributeAssignmentType" > 
       <xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="Attribute" type="permis:AttributeType" minOccurs="0" 
maxOccurs="unbounded" /> 
       </xs:sequence> 
        <xs:attribute name="AAID" use="required" type="xs:ID"/> 
     <xs:attribute name="TI" use="required" type="xs:IDREF"/          
        <xs:attribute name="DomainID" use="required" type="xs:IDREF"/> 
<xs:attribute name="DelegationDepth" use="optional" 
type="xs:nonNegativeInteger"/> 
    </xs:complexType> 
<!-- --> 
<xs:complexType name="AttributeType"> 
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<xs:sequence> 
<xs:element name="AttributeValue" type="permis:SubordinateValueType" 
minOccurs="0" > 
<xs:sequence> 
         <xs:attribute name="FriendlyName" use="optional" type="xs:IDREF"/   
</xs:complexType> 
<!-- --> 
</xs:schema> 
 
 
